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Abstract
Social engineering attacks (SE-attacks) in enterprises are hastily growing and are
becoming increasingly sophisticated. Generally, SE-attacks involve the psychological
manipulation of employees into revealing confidential and valuable company data to
cybercriminals. The ramifications could bring devastating financial and irreparable
reputation loss to the companies. Because SE-attacks involve a human element,
preventing these attacks can be tricky and challenging and has become a topic of interest
for many researchers and security experts. While methods exist for detecting SE-attacks,
our literature review of existing methods identified many crucial factors such as the
national cultural, organizational, and personality traits of employees that enable SEattacks not considered by the other researchers. Thus, this thesis aims to address the gap
by identifying and analyzing all the factors that make the SE-attack possible. We have
developed a framework that operates in an enterprise environment and can detect the
susceptibility of victims to SE-attacks. It relies on mapping Gragg’s psychological
triggers of social engineering to three groups of factors, namely the national cultural
factors, the organizational factors, and the personality traits of employees. Our analysis
demonstrates that there is a correlation between the social engineering triggers and the
three-layered factors that make employees susceptible to social engineering attacks. Thus,
adding these factors in the proposed framework detects susceptibility of victims. Finally,
we introduce a proposed framework that would detect and recognize weaknesses and
susceptibility of employees in an organization which can be used for enhancing
awareness and employee training to better recognize and prevent SE-attacks.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Theoretical Background
Over the past years, social engineering attacks have proven to be one of the biggest
concerns affecting the IT infrastructure, both in the private and public sectors. The
damage it has imposed on corporates and the difficulty of avoiding such attacks have
made social engineering the center point for many security experts and researchers. One
issue that has been discussed immensely regarding social engineering is the human factor
and its impact on the recurring success of these attacks. It has become widely known for
many scholars that the human element is the weakest link in any IT system (Mitnick,
Simon, & L., 2003) and (GBC-DELL Survey, 2015). How employees think and behave
in the workplace is considered an important factor that can lead to more or less amounts
of cyber threats (Ranjeev & Lawless, 2015). Therefore, it is crucial to study the factors
and reasons influencing the behavior and values of employees to have a better
understanding of how to deal with human-based attacks such as social engineering
attacks.
To understand the issue more clearly, we must first understand what we mean by social
engineering attacks and how they are carried out. One definition states that social
engineering is the use of psychological influence to manipulate a victim and gain his trust
so he would be eventually revealing information (Allen, 2006, p.4). From that definition,
we discover that the potential success of these attacks relies mainly on the vulnerability
of the human factor. According to Ross (Ross, 2006), systems consist of three elements:
hardware, software, and wetware. Wetware represents the human element in the system.
Regardless of the amount of money and work put into enforcing the security of the IT
infrastructure, a social engineer can patiently exploit the weaknesses of human nature and
gain unauthorized access to sensitive information using his knowledge of psychological
tricks and triggers (Allen, 2006, p.4).
There are several factors on different levels that can influence the target and play a role in
defining the possibility of the success of social engineering attacks. Some of the factors
are related to the personality features of the victims and how they behave socially. Others
are concerned with cultural factors designed by the society people live in. These factors
play a role in social engineering attacks and can be used to measure the susceptibility of
individuals based on them.
Based on previous research, there has been some work done towards mapping the
psychological triggers of SE attacks to human-based factors. One of the studies focused
on mapping Cialdini’s principles of persuasion to the five personality traits of a victim
(Uebelacker, S., & Quiel, S. 2014). However, there has not been a framework designed to
take into consideration the impact of other factors that can be influenced by the
environment of the victims. Even though researchers have indicated the existence of a
relationship between the susceptibility of SE attacks and various factors (Parrish Jr, J. L.,
Bailey, J. L., & Courtney, J. F., 2009), we believe a framework that can map that
2

relationship is needed to be designed as it can provide a better understanding of the SE
attacks and how can we come up with more successful countermeasures. Cultural factors
are some of these influencers that can dictate humans’ mentality and behavior. These
factors can be defined on a national scale or within the organization, which can be
perceived as national and corporate culture. Their importance comes from their role in
defining the environment of the employees that can be targeted, and analyzing such
factors will give us a broader view of social engineering attacks enabling causes.
Expanding the cultural vision from corporate to national can provide us with a better idea
of how culture in general influences and affects security-related issues (Übelacker, S.,
2013). Moreover, as national cultures exist on a higher layer, they are excluded from an
organization’s influence which makes them offer a cultural frame in which organizational
cultures thrive (Übelacker, S., 2013). In addition, behaviors related to national cultures
must be considered when we study and evaluate organizational cultures (Übelacker, S.,
2013).
Based on our evaluation of existing research on the topic, we have developed a
framework that is used to detect the susceptibility of social engineering attacks of
victims. The framework focuses on the victims operating mainly in an organizational
environment. It relies on mapping Gragg’s psychological triggers of social engineering to
three groups of factors. These groups are the national cultural factors, the organizational
factors, and the occupational personality traits. By covering these three groups of factors,
we would have a layered and comprehensive approach that can enable us to analyze and
detect the possible reasons that can lead to SE attacks in any given environment. Also, we
also provided an additional framework that can use the result of the factors’ impact in
measuring the susceptibility of workers in certain organization, and creating a tailored
awareness program. We firmly believe that such a framework will manage to cover the
main factors that can influence victims in any given organization.
In the next sections, we will start by defining the concept of social engineering. Then, we
are going to discuss the components of our suggested framework that measures the
impact of the factors, and define their elements. We describe the psychological triggers of
SE created by Gragg. Then, we will define the three groups of factors and what each
factor represents. Finally, we are going to define our framework and discuss the mapped
relationships between the factors and the triggers. Finally, we introduce a proposed
framework that would detect and recognize weaknesses and susceptibility of employees
in an organization, and would provide the ability to design a personalized training and
education program to raise employee’s awareness against cybersecurity threats.
1.2. Social Engineering Definitions
1.2.1 In Social Science
Within the context of social science, Social Engineering is defined as the discipline that
focuses on manipulating and influencing people’s popular beliefs, attitudes, actions, and
social behaviors at a wide level (Stergiou, D., 2013). In Wikipedia, social engineering is
3

defined as a top-down process used to influence specific behaviors and social attitudes on
a high level for the purpose of producing sought characteristics in a target or a group of
targets (Wikipedia, 2021).
1.2.2 In Information Security
Researchers have profoundly covered the definition of social engineering within the
context of information security. According to (Mann, M. I., 2012), social engineering is
the art of manipulating people using deception for the sake of obtaining information from
them or persuade them to perform an action. Hadnagy (2010) elaborated furthermore to
state that the solicited action may or may not in the deceived people’s interest. Although
according to Hadnagy (2010), that may be true when social engineering is applied to a
field like medicine, it is inconceivable to presume common interest from social
engineering in information security. Another definition states that social engineering is
psychological exploitation that scammers utilize to manipulate human vulnerabilities and
launch emotional-based attacks on vulnerable people (Atkins, 2013). One popular
definition defines it as the act of manipulating a person to achieve objectives that may or
may not be in the target’s interests (Hadnagy et al., 2010).
Additionally, we found out that most of the researchers that studied social engineering
shared the same fundamental idea, which revolves around exploiting the vulnerability of
the human user (Mann, M. I., 2012) (Hadnagy, 2010) (Pfleeger, C. P., & Pfleeger, S.,
2006) (Salahdine, F., & Kaabouch, N., 2019).
1.3 Psychological Triggers of Social Engineering
It is only logical to try to comprehend the psychology behind social engineering before
developing a defense mechanism against it since it is both a social and psychological
exercise (Gragg, (2003). In his work, (Gragg, 2003) has defined the psychological
triggers which have the ability to influence or persuade people within the context of
social engineering. He came up with seven triggers that are believed to be used by
hackers and social engineers to manipulate their targets psychologically (Gragg, 2003).
These triggers are shown in figure 1, and we will explain each trigger subsequently.

4

Figure 1 Psychological Triggers of Social Engineering

1.3.1 Strong Affect
Strong affect is a trigger that makes use of an intensified and heightened emotional state
to allow a social engineer to obtain more than what would be reasonable (Gragg, 2003).
To illustrate more, the victim is less likely to properly process presented arguments if he
is experiencing a high sense of anger, surprise, or anticipation. Upon using this trigger,
the hacker will trigger the targeted emotion to distract the victim and disturb their ability
to think logically, evaluate, or create counterarguments (Scheeres, J. W., 2008).
1.3.2 Overloading
By implementing overloading, mistaken premises will be challenged as they are
introduced hastily and are shoved between convincing arguments (Gragg, 2003). The
victim’s logical functioning will be affected if he must deal with a lot of information
quickly which could lead to a state of overload. People become mentally passive when
facing big amounts of information to process; they tend to accept information instead of
evaluating it (Burtner, p. 2).
1.3.3 Reciprocation
It is commonly known as a rule in our daily social interactions that we should always
return the favor of other people. People would return the favor even it is more valuable
5

than the original act, or the original act was not requested in the first place (Rusch, J. J.,
1999). Reciprocation is regularly used in the corporate environment. Employees help
each other out with the hope that the favor will be returned. It has become an unspoken
system that is perceived crucial for the future success of the employees. Unfortunately,
social engineers take advantage of this system (Gragg, 2003).
1.3.4 Deceptive Relationships
Deceptive relationships trigger is the concept of establishing a relationship with the aim
of exploiting the other person (Gragg, 2003). It can be done in several ways, like sharing
information or sharing a common enemy. There are many ways to exploit the relationship
once it has been developed (Vigilante).
1.3.5 Diffusion of Responsibility and Moral Duty
This is a method where the hacker tricks the target into believing that they will be spared
from responsibilities towards their actions, or their actions will hold a positive outcome
(Scheeres, J. W., 2008). The targets are made to believe that their decisions will be the
difference between the success or failure of the discussed situation (Gragg, 2003).
1.3.6 Authority
We normally respond to authority as it is in our human nature. Convincing the target that
he is dealing with some authority figure can bring a great benefit for the social engineer.
The fact that it is even more difficult to verify the authority of the perpetrator makes this
a trigger a very powerful one (Gragg, 2003). In real life, we see this trigger being used
widely by hackers.
1.3.7 Integrity/Consistency
In this trigger, the hackers will make use of people’s inclination towards following
commitments for the purpose of persuading them to execute some action (Gragg, 2003)
(Scheeres, J. W. (2008)). From another aspect, “people have a tendency to believe that
others are expressing their true attitudes when they make a statement” (Gragg, 2003). The
tendency to believe others is based mainly on their own honesty in expressing emotions
(Rusch, 1999).
1.4 National Cultures
In his 5-D model, Hofstede (1980) explained the five cultural dimensions per country. He
defined them to include: power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty
avoidance, and long-term orientation (Hofstede Center.). It is considered that various
nations react differently to anthropological issues. Those issues can include analyzing
how to work out unfairness, behavior with regard to the relationship of individual in a
community, how to handle uncertainty, and the assumptions of gender (Anon, 2015).
According to available research, there is a need for more evaluation on the impact of
these dimensions on security-related issues. Table 1 describes those five dimensions.
6

Table 1 Hofstede 5-D Model of National Culture. From (Hofstede Center) & (Übelacker, S., 2013).

Dimension

Description

Power Distance (PDI)

The expectation and acceptance of
unequally distributed power among
members of institutions and organizations
in a country.

Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV)

Reflects “the degree of interdependence a
society maintains among its members.”

Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS)

Describes the motivation of people what
they think is important to achieve.
Wanting to be the best is “masculine”;
liking what you do defined as “feminine”.

Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)

Specifies whether members of a culture
experience “ambiguous or unknown
situations” as a threat that needs to be
avoided.

Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation
(LTO)

Pictures the degree a society has towards a
future-oriented or short-term perspective.

1.5 Organizational Cultures
According to (Hofstede Center.), “organizational culture is the way in which members of
an organization relate to each other, their work and the outside world in comparison to
other organizations”. Organizational culture involves working people in an organization
inducing on them a form of organizational behavior (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), (Scholz,
1987), (Watkins, 2013), and (A. Leroch, 2014). There have been many studies conducted
on the topic of organizational culture. One of the studies is the Multi-Focus Model on
Organizational Culture developed by Hofstede (Hofstede Center.). It concluded that there
are six dimensions of organizational culture that can be used to measure the cultural level
of a certain organization (Hofstede Center.). As shown in Table 2, These dimensions
include organizational effectiveness, customer orientation, level of control, focus,
approachability, and management philosophy.
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Table 2 Hofstede Multi-Focus Model on Organizational Culture. From (Hofstede Center.)

Dimension

Description
•

This dimension is closely
connected to the effectiveness of
the organization.

•

In a means-oriented culture, the
key feature is the way in which
work must be carried out, the
“how”.

•

In a goal-oriented culture,
employees are primarily out to
achieve specific internal goals or
results, the “what”.

•

In a highly internally driven
culture, employees perceive their
task towards the outside world as
a given, based on the idea that
business ethics and honesty
matter most.

•

In a very externally driven
culture, the only emphasis is on
meeting the customer’s
requirements; results are most
important.

•

This dimension refers to the
amount of internal structuring,
control, and discipline.

•

A very easygoing culture reveals
an internal fluid structure, a lack
of predictability, and little control
and discipline.

•

A very strict work discipline
reveals the reverse.

•

In a local company, employees
identify with the boss and/or the
unit in which one works.

Organizational effectiveness
Means-Oriented VS. Goal-Oriented

Customer orientation
Internally Driven VS. Externally Driven

Level of control
Easygoing Work Discipline VS. Strict
Work Discipline

Focus
Local VS. Professional
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Approachability

•

In a professional organization, the
identity of an employee is
determined by his profession
and/or the content of the job.

•

This dimension relates to the
accessibility of an organization.

•

In a very open culture,
newcomers are made immediately
welcome.

•

In a very closed organization, it is
the reverse.

•

In very employee-oriented
organizations, members of staff
feel that personal problems are
considered.

•

In very work-oriented
organizations, there is heavy
pressure to perform the task even
if this is at the expense of
employees.

Open System VS. Closed System

Management philosophy
Employee-Oriented VS. Work-Oriented

1.6 Occupational Personality Traits
In previous studies, researchers have been studying the personality traits of employees
within the work environment. Occupational grouping of personalities of workers can help
to assess the organizational subcultures of the organization (Übelacker, 2013). Hossiep
and Paschen (2012) developed their version of an employee’s personality traits which is
based on the employee’s type of occupation. They named it “Bochumer Inventar zur
berufsbezogenen Persönlichkeits-beschreibung (BIP)”; it means a German personality
inventory for organizational applications. The traits are comprised of occupational
orientation, work behavior, interpersonal skills “social skills”, and mental constitution.
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Table 3 A German personality Inventory for Organizational Applications (Hossiep and Paschen, 2012).

Trait

Description
•

It refers to the employee’s
motivation to work with a high
standard of quality as well as the
tendency to design processes and
structures to use, and his
motivation for social influence.

•

It refers to the employee’s level of
conscientiousness, flexibility, and
willingness to turn decisions into
implementable activities.

•

These skills include sensitivity,
contacting ability, sociability,
teamwork orientation, and
assertiveness.

•

It defines an employee’s emotional
stability, resilience, and
confidence.

Occupational orientation

Work behavior

Interpersonal skills (social skills)

Mental constitution

After providing a theoretical background of the topic, we are going to present the thesis
as follows: chapter 2 is going to discuss the suggested framework and the impact of its
layers on the susceptibility of SE attacks as well as providing a statistical approach to
find the significance. In chapter 3, the thesis will explain how to apply the framework
practically. In chapter 4, we are going to provide our conclusion and the direction of
future work.
Chapter 2: The Three-Layered Framework
2.1 Research Methodology
In this thesis, we adopted a theoretical approach to evaluate the correlation between the
three-layered factors we used and the SE psychological triggers. We hope to validate the
framework in the future by conducting empirical research to test our findings.
The examined studies show some shortcomings that an organization may encounter when
implementing policies, countermeasures, and mechanisms for preventing social
engineering attacks. For a start, a limitation in executing countermeasures originates from
10

the education, capability, skills, and personality traits of employees (Flores, & Ekstedt,
2013), (Peltier, 2006), and (Algarni et al., 2013).
The distinctions between workers create a significant challenge in the implementation
process of defensive measures. Moreover, the difference in training and level of
awareness amongst workers restricts the progress of these countermeasures as well (Fan,
Lwakatare, & Rong, 2017), and (Mataracioglu, & Ozkan, 2011).
The methods used by attackers to obtain corporate sensitive information are always
evolving. Protecting important information is reliant on the capability to influence and
convince workers to adjust their behaviors and practices that lead to the disclosure of
private information that can be used by attackers (Smith, Papadaki, & Furnell, 2013), and
(Greavu-Serban, & Serban, 2014). Based on that, there is a need to address the role and
impact of factors influencing the behavior of employees within an organization. We think
that our framework will provide a mechanism to study such a phenomenon in the context
of cultural influence.
We mainly focused on the impact of national cultural factors, organizational factors, and
employees’ personality traits on the susceptibility to SE attacks. It is based on our firm
belief that the characteristics of the environment surrounding the targets in organizations
can help increase or decrease their susceptibility to SE attacks. Therefore, we sought out
the answers to the following questions:
•

What are the reasons leading to a successful SE attack?

•

Does the susceptibility to SE attacks differ based on the national culture of
targets?

•

Does the susceptibility to SE attacks differ based on the organizational culture of
targets?

•

Does the susceptibility to SE attacks differ according to employee’s personality
traits?

•

How can we utilize the findings in an organizational context?

To answer our research questions, we conducted a comprehensive literature review on
SE-related literature as well as studies revolving around cultural influence. We aimed to
define a correlation between the studied factors and the SE triggers and map these factors
in regard to their influence on their correlated elements. We used a layered approach with
our evaluation of the factors of the framework. Such an approach focuses on the effect of
each layer on the next one. As a result, we managed to establish a framework that maps
the susceptibility to SE attacks with cultural factors by proxy. Moreover, we proposed a
practical framework aimed at measuring the susceptibility in each organization to
develop better educational and training programs.
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2.2 Suggested Framework to Measure the Influence of the Three-Layered Factors
Our research on existing literature indicates that there is hierarchical influence among
three layers of factors. The features of a national culture can have its impact on shaping
the cultural values of an organization within. Also, the set of values of a certain
organization is reflected upon the behavior of its employees. Therefore, the susceptibility
of employees to social engineering attacks may be higher or lower based on the
environment of these employees, nationally and within the organization.
Because of that, we claim that it is very useful to evaluate the relationships of these
factors with the social engineering psychological triggers to develop a more
comprehensive understanding of such attacks and how to better handle them.
Regardless of the fact that a direct correlation of cultures and security awareness might
appear to be difficult, we should not disregard their influence on human behavior within
the context of security awareness (Übelacker, S., 2013). Therefore, we will utilize our
conclusions, and apply them to a framework designed for the purpose of providing a
mechanism to improve the susceptibility of employees in an organization.
2.2.1 The Impact of National Culture on The Organizational Culture
Even though it is possible to measure the correlation between the national culture factors
and the SE triggers, it is more convenient for us to avoid cultural bias to first analyze
their impact on the organizational culture, which shapes the behavior of the establishment
employees or potential targets. National cultures provide a frame in which organizational
cultures function (Übelacker, S., 2013). Values and norms defining national cultures must
be considered when we evaluate organizational culture factors. To do that in our research,
we are going to discuss the impact of each national cultural factor on the factors
comprising the organizational culture by mapping each influential factor to its influenced
organizational factor.
Based on existing research, it has been widely noted that there exists a relationship
between national and organizational cultures (Schneider, B., & Smith, D. B., Eds., 2004).
Westwood (1992) states in his work the consequences of the national cultural dimensions
scores on the organizational level. His findings explained the relationship of each
dimension on the organizational norms and behaviors. Additionally, there are significant
influences of culture on the work values which have been proved by the paper of Claes
and Ruiz-Quintanilla (1998) when we take into consideration the dimensions introduced
by Hofstede (1991).
A. Power Distance
Upon analyzing the Power Distance dimension (PDI), we discovered that it substantially
affects three organizational dimensions namely level of control, dimension of focus and
the management philosophy dimension. PDI can influence the organizational culture with
regard to the dimension of the level of control. High power distance encourages a strict
12

work discipline, while low scores would be catering for the creation of easy-going
discipline. The subordinate and supervisor in large power distance countries have large
emotional distance between them which disheartens the subordinate of getting guidance
by the supervisor. On the ither hand, the working relationships in small power distance
countries are more confirmed and there are communication, skill-development behaviors,
and networking (Masouras, & Papademetriou, 2014).
PDI also can relate to the dimension of focus as high scores promote local-based focus,
and low scores would lead to professional-based. In high power distance countries,
organizational structures are very centralized with clear levels of managers and
subordinates and tall hierarchies (Hofstede, 2001).
The management philosophy dimension is affected as well by PDI, where high scores
influence a work-oriented philosophy, and low scores would promote the reverse.
According to Hofstede (2001), countries with high PDI influence organizations where
managers depend on formal rules and guidance to manage using an authoritative
managerial style and decision making.
Table 4 Power Distance Impact on Organizational Culture

Organizational
Culture Dimensions

High Power Distance
Strict Work Discipline
•

Level of Control
•

Easy-Going Discipline

The subordinate and
•
supervisor have big emotional
distance between them.
•
The subordinates are
discouraged of getting advice
by the supervisor.

Local-Based Focus

The working relationships are
more promoted.
There are skill-development
behaviors, communication,
and networking.

Professional-Based Focus

•

Organizational structures are
very centralized.

•

Flat organizational
hierarchies.

•

Tall hierarchies and clear
levels of managers and
subordinates.

•

Decentralized structures.

Focus

Work-Oriented Philosophy
Management
Philosophy

Low Power Distance

Employee-Oriented Philosophy

•

Managers rely on formal
rules to manage.

•

Managers rely on personal
experience.

•

Authoritative managerial
style and decision making.

•

More consultative or
collaborative forms of
decision making.
13

B. Uncertainty Avoidance
It was noted that national cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (UAI) have a positive
impact on the organizational effectiveness dimension. A low value of uncertainty
avoidance is more likely to lead to mean-oriented organizational cultures. On the other
hand, a high score of uncertainty avoidance would contribute towards more goal-oriented
workplaces. Countries with weak uncertainty avoidance are open to new ideas, rewarding
systems, and innovative behavior at the workplace. On the contrary, strong uncertainty
avoidance nations are resistant to new ideas and innovation, and support workers’
motivation using security (Masouras, & Papademetriou, 2014).
Additionally, UAI also contributes to the dimension of level of control. High UAI will
influence a stricter work culture while low scores would influence the reverse. As stated
by Hofstede (1986), nations with low uncertainty-avoidance are open minded and often
try to minimize uncertainty. Therefore, they welcome new things and lifelong learning
leading to an easy-going work environment.
Table 5 Uncertainty Avoidance Impact on Organizational Culture

Organizational Culture
Dimensions

High Uncertainty Avoidance
Goal-Oriented

Organizational
Effectiveness

•

Resistance to new ideas and
innovation and support employee’s
motivation by security.

Strict Work Discipline

Level of Control

•

Superiors are pessimistic about
subordinate ambition.

•

Innovators feel constrained by
rules.

•

Resistance to new things and
lifelong learning.

Low Uncertainty Avoidance
Means-Oriented
>

Openness to new ideas, innovative
behavior, rewarding systems at the
workplace.

Easy-Going Discipline
•

Acceptance of new things and
lifelong learning which leads to an
easy-going work environment.

C. Individualism vs. Collectivism
For the dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV), its score would influence the
dimension of customer orientation. A high IDV collective score is likely to create an
internally driven environment, and high IDV individualistic scores influence an
externally driven culture. Collective cultures would lead to a work culture in which
workers act in the interest of the in-group, and their loyalty to the company is relatively
low. Also, employee-employer relations are almost like a family bond. In individualistic
nations, workers act in their interests, and their loyalty to the organizations is high.
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Additionally, the employee-employer relationship is based on the market (Hofstede,
2001).
In addition to that, IDV would have the same influence on the dimension of level of
control as collective cultures are easy-going in their work discipline and the opposite is
leaning towards strict ethics. Howard et al., (1983) concluded that Japanese managers
acquire social values in comparison to American managers who are individualists.
Also, IDV can be correlated to the dimension of focus. Collective cultures aspire for
more local-focused organizational cultures, and individualistic ones push toward
professional focus. Youn (2000) proved in his study that individualist nations like the
United States have more powerful learning beliefs than collectivist nations like South
Korea for the reason that individualism encourages the challenge to work.
IDV is also mapped to the dimension of approachability. Collectivism in a certain culture
carries its effect to more open systems while individualism creates the inclination to
closed systems. Hofstede (1991) states that in the workplace, the workers from
individualistic countries are more independent, worry about them and plan future career.
On the contrary, workers from collective nations are more open to training, sharing their
skills, having good relationships and support common tasks.
Finally, IDV with high collective scores leads to establishing a work-oriented philosophy.
High IDV individualistic scores indicate more focus on employee-oriented management
philosophy. Hui and Yee (1999) proved in their study in Hong Kong that there are
variations in job satisfaction and teambuilding amongst collectivist and individualist
employees. Collectivists promote teambuilding while individualistic workers promote
more job satisfaction. Kanungo and Wright (1983) showed that British managers assign
more importance to independence and individual accomplishment than French managers.
On the opposite, French managers give value to organization policies, security, expert
management, and comfortable conditions in work.
Table 6 IvC Impact on Organizational Culture

Organizational Culture
Dimensions

Individualism
Externally Driven

Customer Orientation

Level of Control

Collectivism
Internally Driven

•

Employees act in their own
interests.

•

Employees act in the interest of ingroup

•

Commitment to the organizations
is high.

•

Commitment to the company is
relatively low.

•

Employee-Employer relationship is •
based on the market.

Strict Work Discipline

Employee-Employer relationships
are almost like a family link

Easy-Going Discipline
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•

Managers are individualists in their
relationships with employees.

•

Tasks and company prevail over
personal relationships.

Professional-Based Focus

Focus

•

Stronger learning beliefs.

•

Promotes the challenge to work.

Closed Systems
Approachability

Managers develop social values.

•

Better to reward based on equality
(give everyone the same reward).

•

Support of teamwork.

Local-Based Focus
•

Employee-Employer relationships
is almost like a family link.

•

Belief in collective decisions.

•

Personal relationships very critical
in business.

Open Systems

•

The workers are more independent.

•

Workers are open to training.

•

Workers worry only about them
and plan future career.

•

Open to share their skills.

•

Workers have good relationships
and support common tasks.

Employee-Oriented Philosophy
Management
Philosophy

•

•

Individualistic culture promotes
job satisfaction.

Work-Oriented Philosophy
•

Give importance to company
policies, security, expert
management.

D. Masculinity vs. Femininity
In the masculinity vs. femininity (MAS) dimension, a feminine culture encourages an
easy-going level of control while masculinity promotes a level of control that is strict
relatively. Hofstede (2001) states that the employee’s relationship with work in masculine
cultures is based on living to work and seeking high pay. Moreover, workers look for
security, high pay, and interesting work. While in feminine cultures, employees work in
order to live, and they prefer to work for fewer hours. Also, workers look for better
working conditions and relationships in work.
Moreover, MAS is an influencing factor on the dimension of approachability. High
scores in femininity are very supportive of open systems in the corporate environment.
However, based on analyzing the influence masculinity, it is likely that its effect on
approachability may not be of relevance. According to Claes and Ruiz-Quintanilla
(1998), masculinity deals with a challenging job, recognition, a chance for advancement
to higher-level jobs, competition between colleagues and performance, wages, and career
planning. Femininity cultures promote collaboration in work, security, and good working
connections. Moreover, feminine cultures promote consultation, skill improvement, and
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networking. These are practices that are promoted by small power distance nations as
well.
As for the dimension of management philosophy, a feminine national culture can help
shift the orientation of the management philosophy on the employees’ side while
masculinity can be inclined towards a job-oriented environment. Hofstede (2001)
mentions that feminine cultures influence managers to be employees like others, and
work problems are resolved by compromise and negotiations.
Table 7 MvF Impact on Organizational Culture

Organizational Culture
Dimensions

Masculinity
Closed Systems
•

Approachability

Challenging work, recognition, and
opportunity for development to
higher level jobs.

•

Competition among colleagues in
performance and earnings.

•

Facilitates career planning.

Strict Work Discipline

Level of Control

•

Employee’s relationship with work
is based on living in order to work.

•

Seeking a high pay.

•

Workers look for security.

Work-Oriented Philosophy
Management
Philosophy

Femininity
Open Systems
•

Cooperation in work.

•

Security and good working
relationships.

•

Consultation, skill development
and networking.

Easy-Going Discipline
•

Employees work in order to live.

•

They prefer to work for less hours.

•

Workers look for better working
conditions and relationships in
work.

Employee-Oriented Philosophy

•

The company projects are
prioritized over employees.

•

Managers are influenced to be
employees like others.

•

Conflicts are resolved through
fighting until the best “man” wins.

•

Work problems are resolved
through compromise and
negotiations.

E. Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation
To the best of our knowledge, the influence of the long-term vs short-term dimension on
the organizational culture is not considered by other researchers. Intuitively, this
dimension influences organizational cultures as nations develop commitments either on
long-term or short-term. Have consistency, if use hyphen between long-term and short17

term have that everywhere. Long-term orientation focuses on the future by postponing
short-term material or short-term emotional satisfaction. On the contrary, short-term
orientation is when you are centered around the present or past and consider them more
important than the future.

Figure 2 The Influence of National Culture on Organizational Culture

2.2.2 The Impact of Organizational Culture on Employee’s Personality Traits
Factors such as organizational culture influence the shaping of the information security
culture. Empirical studies have confirmed the impact of organizational culture on the
culture of information security. On itself, information security culture is acknowledged as
part of the corporate culture (Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 2007), (Dojkovski,
Lichtenstein, & Warren, 2006), (Schlienger & Teufel, 2005). Therefore, studying the
impact of these factors can help to improve the overall security awareness of the
organization. According to (Jedge and Cable, 1997), organizational cultures are linked to
personality traits that respond to the attributes of organizational culture’s factors. without
doubt the organizational culture is linked to personality trait. Based on general
understanding, we claim that organizational cultural dimensions influence personality
traits. We intend to show the verification of our claim and calculation of that relationship
score through empirical studies in the future.
A. Organizational effectiveness
This dimension is closely connected to the effectiveness of the organization. In a meansoriented culture, the key feature is the way in which work has to be carried out–the
“how”. In a goal-oriented culture, employees are primarily out to achieve specific internal
goals or results–the “what”.
This dimension opposes a concern with the means of doing the job to a concern with the
goals set by organizations. In the means-oriented cultures, people regard themselves as
dodging risks and giving only a little effort in their jobs, while living each day with the
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same routine. In goals-oriented cultures, people recognize themselves as comfortable in
unfamiliar conditions and put in a maximal work effort, while each day is considered to
bring different challenges. It is challenging not to attach a “good” label to the goalsoriented side and a “bad” label to the other side for this dimension. However,
organizations differ with their priorities based on the nature of their business.
B. Customer orientation
In a highly internally driven culture, employees perceive their task towards the outside
world as a given, based on the idea that business ethics and honesty matter most. In a
very externally driven culture, the only emphasis is on meeting the customer’s
requirements; results are most important.
This dimension deals with the popular assumption of customer orientation. Pragmatic
units were market-driven, while normative units perceived their task in relation to the
outside world. We can see that in the normative units, the major stress was on accurately
following organizational plans, which were more important than results. In the pragmatic
units, there was a major stress on satisfying the customer’s requirements; outcomes were
more valuable than exact procedures.
C. Level of control
This dimension refers to the amount of internal structuring, control, and discipline. A
very easygoing culture reveals an internal fluid structure, a lack of predictability, and
little control and discipline. A very strict work discipline reveals the reverse.
It relates to the volume of internal structuring in the organization. People in loose control
units believed that no one thought of cost, the meeting time was only set approximately,
and jokes about the business and the job were common. People in tight control units
expressed their work environment as cost-conscious, meeting times were kept punctually,
and jokes about the company and/or the job were limited.
D. Focus
In a local company, employees identify with the boss and/or the unit in which one works.
In a professional organization, the identity of an employee is determined by his
profession and/or the content of the job.
This dimension crosses units whose employees obtain their identity mainly from the
organization to units in which people classify with their type of job. Members of
parochial cultures considered that the organization’s norms related to their behavior at
home as well as on the job. They felt that in hiring employees, the company looked at
their social and family background as much as their job competence. On the other hand,
members of professional cultures viewed their private lives as their own affairs. They
thought the organization hired on the basis of job competence only, and they did think far
ahead.
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E. Approachability
This dimension relates to the accessibility of an organization. In a very open culture,
newcomers are made immediately welcome. In a very closed organization, it is the
reverse.
Moreover, approachability opposes open systems to closed systems. In the open system
units, members viewed both the company and its people as open to newcomers and
outsiders. Nearly anyone would click into the organization, and new workers required
only a few days to feel at home. In the closed system units, the organization and its
workers were thought to be closed and reserved, even amongst insiders. Only very
particular people fit into the organization, and new employees demanded more than a
year to feel at home.
F. Management philosophy
In very employee-oriented organizations, members of staff feel that personal problems
are considered. In very work-oriented organizations, there is heavy pressure to perform
the task even if this is at the expense of employees.
This dimension crosses a concern for employees to a concern for completing the job. In
employee-oriented cultures, workers felt that their individual difficulties were taken into
account and that the organization took accountability for employees' welfare. Also, major
decisions were initiated by groups or committees. In the job-oriented units, people
encountered intense pressure to complete the task. They regarded the organization as
involved only in the work workers did and not in their personal and family welfare. They
perceive that important decisions were made by individuals.

Figure 3 The Impact of Organizational Culture on Employee’s Personality Traits
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2.2.3 The Impact of Employee’s Personality Traits on the Susceptibility to SE
Attacks
A. Occupational Orientation
As occupational orientation defines the employees’ ability to work at high standards and
adhere to rules, they are vulnerable to methods that make use of social norms, policies,
and rules. Continuance commitment, which is linked to occupational orientation,
increases the vulnerability to SE. For example, even though people are concerned
regarding their personal information, they would actively trade-off privacy for
convenience as a result of a cost-benefit correlation to the benefits of perceived rewards
(Uebelacker, & Quiel, 2014) & (Workman, 2008). Therefore, we suggest that it is
correlated with the triggers: reciprocity, authority, and Integrity/consistency. It has also
been declared that security training can reduce SE susceptibility, particularly for
conscientious people (Parrish Jr et al., 2009).
B. Work Behavior
The level of flexibility in the employee’s work behavior and his openness to new
experiences would likely lead to an increased level of susceptibility to SE attacks. People
with high openness values are less concerned about privacy issues connected to locationbased services. These people’s inclination to explore new experiences affects their risk
evaluation (Junglas, & Spitzmuller, 2006). This can be conveyed to SE that free-minded
people underrate the risk of becoming a victim and consequently do not exhibit sufficient
coping strategies (Uebelacker, & Quiel, 2014). However, openness could lead employees
to more technological proficiency which make them less vulnerable to SE attacks. As a
result, we think that work behavior is only related to the trigger of strong affect for the
reason of open people inclination to the belief of freedom of constraints.
C. Interpersonal Skills (Social Skills)
Employees with a high sense of trust tend to worry less about issues like privacy
infringement. Extraversion is a defining factor in the interpersonal skills of employees.
Extraverted people are considered a higher security risk (Darwish et al., 2012).
Additionally, extraverted workers are more likely to infringe cyber-security policies,
therefore, deciding to oppose policies to comply with suspicious and malicious requests
(McBride et al., 2012). Weirich and Sasse (2001) show that employees who did not
disclose their passwords, hence displaying a low level of SE susceptibility, are perceived
as unsocial and distant by their co-workers, indicating low extraversion values. We can
infer that the susceptibility of trusting people would be high since they would be willing
to share private information with others based on established trust. Moreover, we predict
their influence by the triggers: authority, reciprocity, and deceptive relationships.
D. Mental Constitution
One of the describing attributes to mental constitution is the level of agreeableness of
employees, and their trust and confidence. “Agreeableness is possibly the personality trait
that is most associated with phishing”, and to a greater extent, social engineering (Parrish
Jr et al., 2009). More agreeable people are at a higher chance of a security risk (Darwish
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et al., 2012). Trust, a sub-trait of agreeableness, is assumed to mainly establish the
relationship between agreeableness and SE susceptibility. An assumption that was shown
in studies by (Weirich and Sasse, 2001) and by (Workman, 2008). Moreover, if the
employee achieves low levels of the mental constitution, he would be more likely to be
exploited as his confidence would fall. Nevertheless, more neurotic people are less likely
to violate cyber-security systems (McBride et al., 2012). People low on self-images and
with acknowledged paranoia are more likely not to reveal private information showing a
low level of SE susceptibility (Weirich and Sasse, 2001). We expect hackers to engage
the triggers of overloading, strong affect, diffusion of responsibility and moral duty, and
integrity and consistency.
Table 8 The Impact of Employee's Personality Traits

Employee’s Personality Traits

Occupational Orientation

Work Behavior

Interpersonal Skills (Social
Skills)

Psychological Triggers of Social
Engineering

•

Reciprocity

•

Authority

•

Integrity/Consistency

•

Strong Affect

•

Authority

•

Reciprocity

•

Deceptive Relationships

Description
•

Workers are vulnerable
to methods that make use
of social norms, policies,
and rules.

•

People would actively
trade-off privacy for
convenience as a result of
a cost-benefit correlation
to the benefits of
perceived rewards.

•

Free-minded people
underrate the risk of
becoming a victim.

•

do not exhibit sufficient
coping strategies.

•

Open people are inclined
to the belief of freedom
of constraints.

•

Extraverted workers are
more likely to oppose
policies to comply with
malicious requests.

•

Unsocial and distant
workers display a low
level of SE susceptibility.
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Mental Constitution

•

Overloading

•

Strong Affect

•

Diffusion of Responsibility
and Moral Duty

•

Integrity and Consistency

•

The susceptibility of
trusting people would be
high.

•

More agreeable people
are at a higher chance of
a security risk.

•

Employees with low
levels of mental
constitution, are more
likely to be exploited as
confidence would fall.

Figure 4 The Impact of Employee’s Personality Traits on The Susceptibility to SE Attacks

2.3 Statistical Analysis of National Culture Influence
To validate the proposed framework, there is a need for an appropriate method of
quantitative examinations of our framework's assumptions and hypothesis. The
correlation of the studied factors and the susceptibility to SE attacks can be further
confirmed using empirical data measured within the context of the factors of our
suggested framework. Based on our research, there is a scarcity of available studies
assessing the impact of cultural significance in SE attacks. Moreover, measured data
extracted from empirical studies that can be used to set metrics for the factors influencing
SE susceptibility are not available in abundance, with the exception of national cultural
dimensions. Therefore, we will be conducting a statistical analysis only on the correlation
of Hofstede's national cultural dimensions to SE susceptibility as it has been evaluated
thoroughly in previous research. In addition, the analysis provided will provide a clear
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vision of how practitioners can collect usable data on the rest of the framework, as well
as having an implementable approach to measure the influence of culture within the
context of SE.
Our analysis relied on the study made by (Sample et al., 2017), where they studied the
victims of social engineering attacks as a group within the context of Hofstede's cultural
framework to conclude whether particular cultural dimensions correlate with the victims
of social engineering attacks. We relied on the data implemented in the study to test the
groups as the paper extracted the data related to countries exploited by social engineering
attacks between 2011 to 2014. The resources used to collect the data were: the Zone-H
archive, Hofstede's cultural data values, and the World Internet Stats archive. The data
were filtered to include SE attacks of countries measured by Hofstede's framework.
The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) is a non-parametric statistical test used to
compare two collections from the same population to evaluate the similarity of these two
groups. In our case, we used this test to compare the victims and non-victims’ countries.
Our objective was to assess whether the victim and non-victim groups are culturally
different from a statistical perspective. The probability value (p-value) that emanates
from this analysis would be utilized for inferential purposes. We can conclude the
statistical significance of the p-value if it is equal to 0.05 or less when executing this test.
H0: From a cultural perspective, there are no statistical differences between victims
and non-victims in a given year.
Testing the hypothesis H0 was performed assuming the null hypothesis. The four-year
window was investigated to decide whether longer-term patterns might exist. Therefore,
yearly MWW tests and the Spearman correlation tests were done. The null hypothesis
asserted that each group was statistically the same, suggesting that their distributions
were identical. It can be described mathematically as H0: H1 F(t) = G(t). One or more
dimensions being statistically different with probability values of ≤0.05 is required for
the rejection of the null hypothesis (H0).

Equation 1 Statistical Difference Between Two Groups

𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡 − ∆) 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝐺𝐺 & 𝐹𝐹: 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, ∆: 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
Calculating the MWW relies on ordering the values from smallest to largest and
calculating the sum of the values afterward. S1 is the rank of the Y1, and Sn is the rank of
Y. The following equation shows how it is used.
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Equation 2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Formula
𝑛𝑛

𝑊𝑊 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑊𝑊: 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑛𝑛: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗=1

Results
The data was collected and filtered based on the countries evaluated by Hofstede’s
model, and the type of attack where social engineering attacks were chosen. Out of the
available dataset, we set the countries’ lists based on records from the year 2014. The
countries were divided into two groups: victims, non-victims, where victims refer to
countries that are victims of social engineering attacks, and non-victims are the ones that
did not receive social engineering attacks. The reason is to apply the MWW test and find
the significance value of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.
The number of records collected before filtering by attack was 286103 records. After
filtering by social engineering attacks, the records were 3932. The following table lists
the number of countries and records collected from 2014.
Table 9 List of Countries & Records (Victims & Non-Victims)

Year

Number of
Non-Victim
Countries

2014

Number of
Victim
Countries
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No. of Records for

No. of Records for

Victim Countries (NonSE

Victim Countries
(SE

Attacks)

Attacks)

282171

3932

62

Table 10 Victim Countries National Culture Values (retrieved from Hofstede Center.)

No.

Country

PDI

IvC

MvF

UAI

LvS

IvR

1

ALBANIA

90

20

80

70

61

15

2

ARGENTINA

49

46

56

86

20

62

3

AUSTRALIA

36

90

61

51

21

71

4

BANGLADESH

80

20

55

60

47

20

5

BELGIUM

65

75

54

94

82

57

6

BHUTAN

94

52

32

28

NA

NA

7

BRAZIL

69

38

49

76

44

59

8

BULGARIA

70

30

40

85

69

16

9

CANADA

39

80

52

48

36

68

25

10

CHILE

63

23

28

86

31

68

11

CHINA

80

20

66

30

87

24

12

COLOMBIA

67

13

64

80

13

83

13

CROATIA

73

33

40

80

58

33

14

CZECH.REPUBLIC

57

58

57

74

70

29

15

DENMARK

18

74

16

23

35

70

16

DOMINICAN.REPUBLIC

65

30

65

45

13

54

17

EGYPT

70

25

45

80

7

4

18

ESTONIA

40

60

30

60

82

16

19

FINLAND

33

63

26

59

38

57

20

FRANCE

68

71

43

86

63

48

21

GERMANY

35

67

66

65

83

40

22

GREECE

60

35

57

100

45

50

23

HUNGARY

46

80

88

82

58

31

24

ICELAND

30

60

10

50

28

67

25

INDIA

77

48

56

40

51

26

26

INDONESIA

78

14

46

48

62

38

27

IRAN

58

41

43

59

14

40

28

IRELAND

28

70

68

35

24

65

29

ISRAEL

13

54

47

81

38

NA

30

ITALY

50

76

70

75

61

30

31

JAPAN

54

45

95

92

88

42

32

KENYA

70

25

60

50

NA

NA

33

LATVIA

44

70

9

63

69

13

34

LITHUANIA

42

60

19

65

82

16

35

MALAYSIA

100

26

50

36

41

57

36

MEXICO

81

30

69

82

24

97

37

MOROCCO

70

46

53

68

14

25

38

NEPAL

65

30

40

40

NA

NA

39

NETHERLANDS

38

80

14

53

67

68

26

40

NEW.ZEALAND

22

79

58

49

33

75

41

NIGERIA

80

30

60

55

13

84

42

NORWAY

31

69

8

50

35

55

43

PHILIPPINES

94

32

64

44

27

42

44

POLAND

68

60

64

93

38

29

45

PORTUGAL

63

27

31

99

28

33

46

ROMANIA

90

30

42

90

52

20

47

RUSSIA

93

39

36

95

81

20

48

SAUDI.ARABIA

95

25

60

80

36

52

49

SERBIA

86

25

43

92

52

28

50

SINGAPORE

74

20

48

8

72

46

51

SLOVAKIA

100

52

100

51

77

28

52

SLOVENIA

71

27

19

88

49

48

53

SOUTH.AFRICA

49

65

63

49

34

63

54

SPAIN

57

51

42

86

48

44

55

SWEDEN

31

71

5

29

53

78

56

SWITZERLAND

34

68

70

58

74

78

57

TAIWAN

58

17

45

69

93

49

58

THAILAND

64

20

34

64

32

45

59

TURKEY

66

37

45

85

49

49

60

UK

35

89

66

35

51

69

61

VENEZUELA

81

12

73

76

16

100

Table 11 Non-Victim Countries National Cultural Values (retrieved from Hofstede Center.)

No.

Country

PDI

IvC

MvF

UAI

LvS

IvR

1

BURKINA.FASO

70

15

50

55

27

18

2

CAPE.VERDE

75

20

15

40

12

83

3

ECUADOR

78

8

63

67

NA

NA

4

EL. SALVADOR

66

19

40

94

20

89

5

ETHIOPIA

70

20

65

55

NA

NA

27

6

GHANA

80

15

40

65

4

72

7

GUATEMALA

95

6

37

99

NA

NA

8

HONDURAS

80

20

40

50

NA

NA

9

IRAQ

95

30

70

85

25

17

10

JORDAN

70

30

45

65

16

43

11

KUWAIT

90

25

40

80

NA

NA

12

LEBONAN

75

40

65

50

14

25

13

LIBYA

80

38

52

68

23

34

14

MALAWI

70

30

40

50

NA

NA

15

MOZAMBIQUE

85

15

38

44

11

80

16

NAMIBIA

65

30

40

45

35

NA

17

PAKISTAN

55

14

50

70

50

0

18

PANAMA

95

11

44

86

NA

NA

19

PERU

64

16

42

87

25

46

20

SENEGAL

70

25

45

55

24

NA

21

SYRIA

80

35

52

60

30

NA

22

TANZANIA

70

25

40

50

34

38

23

UAE

90

25

50

80

NA

NA

24

ZAMBIA

60

35

40

50

30

42

28
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Figure 5 National Culture Value Comparison Between USA & Saudi Arabia (Retrieved from Hofstede Center.)

The next table shows the MWW test results between the social engineering victim and
non-victim countries. Tests for statistically significant differences at the 5% (0.05) value
or less are considered successful for statistically showing the existence of a difference.
Test results that are between 5% and 10% are of interest but are not considered for the
success criteria. The 5% to 10% values are determined to be of interest because human
behavior is being measured and it has been observed that there could be an increase in the
type II error when testing human behavior to 5% p-values. Type II error occurs when the
researchers do not succeed in rejecting a null hypothesis which is actually false. The PDI,
IvC, and LvS dimensions consistently showed significant differences between the victim
and non-victim countries.
Table 12 MWW Comparison Between Victim & Non-Victim Countries

Year

PDI

IvC

MvF

UAI

LvS

IvR

2014

0.001975

0.00000749

0.2311

0.926

0.0001158

0.7741

The findings from the Wilcoxon test indicate significant correlation between the cultural
dimensions and the victim countries which achieves the rejection of the null hypothesis.
The results from the tests were, in some samples, unsurprising based on previous studies
(Sample, 2015), (Karamanian et al., 2016), and (Sample & John, 2016). The IvC results
state the effects of the group (Hofstede et al., 2010), (Bornstein, Kugler & Zieglemeyer,
2002). The cultural values seemed to display consistency in this dimension over long
periods. As the victims' group developed over time, the comparison to the non-victims
decreased, appearing in the overall that the victim group is progressing to the full
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Hofstede population, yet the drawing toward individualist societies being victims and
collectivist societies being non-victims persisted to be consistent. As a result, the
individual yearly findings are very relevant.
The consistent findings in the PDI dimension are not only notable but also interesting
given the fact that Hofstede et al. (2010) stated the relationship between authoritarian
values that define high PDI societies and collectivism.
The LvS findings of long-term orientation suggest a possible motive to stay involved
with the attacker or the impersonated character by the attacker. When coupled with low
PDI and individualism characteristics, this may show a desire to discover more about the
attacking side. The short-term orientation linked with non-victims implies that this group
may carry the believe that the attackers will repeat attacking the organization in the
future.
These findings indicate the relationship between culture and cyber behavior which shed
the light on the importance of analyzing that relationship for an improved security
awareness of organizations. Empirically, we need further studies to evaluate and measure
the values of organizational culture and occupational personality traits in order to fully
calculate the influence on external humanistic factors on the susceptibility of employees
to SE attacks. The demand for more cultural examination of cyber behaviors is crucial.
The consequences are vital in terms of training and awareness for SE potential victims.
Based on the same analytical tests, we can measure the significance of the other layers by
collecting the values of these layers through empirical research. For example, let us
assume that one dimension of the organizational factors was measured empirically for a
number of organizations–for example, customer orientation. In this case, the
organizations would be divided into two groups based on SE attacks–victims and nonvictims. We will have numerical values of the customer orientation dimension, and two
groups that we can name: sample 1 and sample 2. To measure the significance of this
dimension on the susceptibility to SE attacks, the steps below are going to be used:
1. For each value in a sample of n items, obtain a difference score Di between the
two groups.
2. Then, ignore positive or negative signs and create a set of n absolute differences
|Di|.
3. Eliminate difference scores of zero, providing you a set of n non-zero absolute
difference scores, where n' ≤ n. Therefore, n' becomes the sample size.
4. Now, assign ranks Ri from 1 to n to each of the |Di| in a way that the smallest
absolute difference score gets rank 1 and the largest gets rank n. If two or more
|Di| are equal, they get assigned the average rank of the ranks they would have
been assigned individually had ties did not occur.
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5. Reassign the symbols “+” or “–” to each of the n ranks Ri, based on whether Di
was previously positive or negative.
6. Subsequently, the Wilcoxon test statistic W is generated as the sum of the positive
ranks.
7. We use the Wilcoxon value to calculate the probability denoted as the p-value for
the reason of measuring the significance of the analyzed factor.
At the end, we would have a full statistical analysis of the factors influencing SE
susceptibility, and their significance within the context of social engineering.
Chapter 3: Applying the Framework
3.1 Proposed Framework to Measure Susceptibility to SE Attacks
To practically use the findings of our suggested framework of the cultural impact, it is
essential to provide a mechanism by which we can utilize the finding when measuring SE
susceptibility of workers in the real life. For that reason, we are proposing a framework
that security practitioners can use to engage the findings of the cultural impact when
developing awareness and training programs for corporations. Our proposed framework
is derived from Kevin Mitnick’s attack cycle (Mitnick, & Simon, 2003) and its detailed
structure is shown in Figure 5. This framework would computationally find weaknesses
and susceptibility of employees in an organization and would create a personalized
training and education program to raise employee’s awareness against cybersecurity
threats. Below we describe how each component of the framework works.

Figure 6 Components of the Proposed Framework
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A. Goals and Target
As shown in Figure 6, in the first phase, the framework identifies the goals and the
targets. All the employees of a national or international organization would be considered
the target. And the main goal is to create a personalized training and education program
based on the susceptibility of the employees to dummy SE threats.
B. Gathering Employee Information
In this step, information about the employees is gathered to support attack vectors. This
step is very crucial for preparation, launching, and testing attacks. All possible sources
from which the information can be obtained including company websites, social
networking sites, phone calls, personal blogs/forums will be first identified. Next, tools
such as Whois, nslookup, and keyhole would be used to gather all pieces of information
(Wikipedia contributors., 2021), (Wikipedia contributors., 2021), and (Keyhole, 2021).
All collected information would then be reviewed to gain intelligence into employee
vulnerabilities. Note, the quality and quantity of information gathered about the target
will determine the probability to obtain relevant results. If not much information is
identified, then the scanning process will restart as shown in Figure 6. The fact that all it
takes is “one employee user” to inadvertently open the gateway to social engineering
attackers in the corporate sector necessitates this step. However, in order to protect the
privacy of the employees, each employee information will be associated with a dummy
name, and any data that identifies the identity of the employee will be removed or
modified. If necessary, the collected information will be encrypted to preserve the
privacy of the employees. Full measures will be taken to keep the employee data
confidential and will not be misused in anyway. The key goal is to educate and train
vulnerable users through customized training and education in order to protect the
security of the individuals as well as the organization where he/she works and thus avoid
the dangerous consequences of SE attacks.
C. Attack Preparation
All the collected bits and pieces of information about the employees are combined and
used for framing all the common SE-attacks against which the users will be tested for
susceptibility. Typically, a malicious actor commonly uses the following attack vectors to
compromise the security of individual and organizations: phishing, vishing, credential
harvester, impersonation, SMishing. In order to attack, dummy versions of these attack
vectors will be generated using the Social-Engineering Toolkit (SET) (Kennedy, 2020).
SET is an open-source penetration testing framework that allows the user to generate a
believable attack quickly and test if the target lures into the target action. Let’s say we are
using this framework for a US-based company name “ABZ” which has two employees
with alias names “Bob” and “Alice”. The following example in Table 13, shows the
national culture factors, organization culture factor along with the scores for each factor
and employee information gathered in above step C. We use the scores for the national
cultural factors using the Hofstede model, however since there is no study that measures
the organization cultural scores the score is marked to be determined (TBD). Measuring
organizational factor scores in outside the scope of this thesis and hence we will be
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continuing this research in the future as we plan to conduct empirical study to determine
these scores for certain companies within US and outside US. However, to show the
crude design, here we show a toy example how the dummy attack would be launched
based on randomly choose High and Low scores for customer orientation, level of
control, focus and approachability factors as shown in Table 13.
Table 13 Example of Gathered Information

US National
Culture Factors
and Scores

Power Distance
(Score 40)

Organizational
Culture Factors
and Scores for
Company “ABZ”
Organizational
effectiveness
(Score: TBD)

Individualism
(Score 91)

Customer
Orientation
(Score: High)

Masculinity
(Score 62)

Level of control
(Score: Low)

Uncertainty
Avoidance
(Score 46)

Focus
(Score: Low)

Long Term
Orientation
(Score 26)

Approachability
(Score: High)

Indulgence
(Score 68)

Management
Philosophy
(Score: TBD)

Employee’s

Bob

Alice

Employee Gathered
Information from Step C

Recently went for vacation
to Hawaii; tweeted about
confrontation with the
manager; has two pet dogs;
etc.

Recent hire (~ 10 months of
employment with “ABZ”,
maintains a blog about faith
and God; etc.

Example attack 1: Individualism (High)--> Level of control (Low)-->Bob twitted about
the confrontation with manager in social media --> launch a credential harvester attack (a
fake email from the manager to Bob that he was fired with a sign-in link to see the details
of the company policy to fire the employees).
Example attack 2: Individualism (High)--> Approachability (High)-->Alice maintains a
blog about belief and God --> launch a phishing attack (a fake email from a church she
regularly visits asking for donation by clicking a link).
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As can be seen from above two dummy examples, attack vectors would include all the
elements of SE attacks including organizational and national cultural factors. This is the
attack plan which would enable the generation of a susceptibility matrix based on how
the individuals respond to these dummy attacks.
D. Testing & Evaluation
In this step, a simulated/dummy attack created using SET toolkit is launched to lure the
target into action. An effective pretext will withstand scrutiny and yet expose the
vulnerabilities of the target. These dummy social engineering attacks will use
manipulation tactics such as launching an email with long text followed by a hyperlink to
click. This text would be crafted based on the information gathered in step B which
evokes the target into remembering a bad or sad incident and subsequently feeling sad.
Once the target is in the desired emotional state, there is a high probability that the target
will click the malicious link that would create security holes in his system and turn the
entire organization at risk. Another attack vector could exploit the faith of the employee.
For example, sending targets emails purportedly from a legitimate church or mosque
website urging them to visit the website, where they are requested to make small
donations for the renovation of the building or something else of similar nature. The
target would then give away the confidential information to the social engineer. Based on
whether the target became victim or not the susceptibility matrix to attack vectors is
generated.
E. Training & Education
Once the susceptibility is measured, customized security awareness training and
education that would guide employees to take corrective measures to stop or reduce the
impact of an SE attack will be recommended. This process would not stop once the goal
of training and education is achieved rather this process would repeat itself periodically
using new attack vector scenarios thereby creating strong human firewalls.
Chapter 4: Conclusion & Future Work
4.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we discussed the impact of organizational cultural factors and personality
traits on the susceptibility of employees to SE attacks. We demonstrate the relationship
between those factors and the social engineering psychological triggers. Furthermore, we
have shown how to use the assumed relationship in a given organization using a proposed
framework that would detect the susceptibility and create an awareness program tailored
for the employees’ specific needs. We hope that the research initiated in this thesis will
motivate other researchers to develop a more comprehensive understanding and
measuring scores for organizational culture, personality traits factors and how each
influence the other in better understanding social engineering attacks, and eventually
design countermeasures and security awareness programs that are more effective in
preventing SE attacks. During our research, we found out the scarcity of existing
literature on the influence of such factors within the context of social engineering which
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pose a challenge for corporates today to mitigate the damage of SE attacks. We
conducted an analysis on the effect of national culture based on statistical tests. Such
analysis could not be done for organizational culture influences since the scores for
organizational culture is unfortunately not available in literature. Thus, in this thesis we
cannot validate the working of our framework and hence we aim to do that in our future
research by first conducting empirical studies measuring the scores for organizational
culture factors.
4.2 Future Research Direction
The proposed framework in this thesis is theoretical and is still at the in the infancy stage
of development. Extensive multi-year research is required to make this proposed
framework fully functional and automatic before it can be adopted and benefit a security
practitioner.
In this thesis, a deep analysis could not be conducted due to unavailability of scores for
various factors for different layers. So, the first part of our future research will involve
conducting empirical experiments to collect data from various companies within US and
outside US. We anticipate that this will be a many years project and require collaboration
with companies and other research collaborators. We will first start with small pool of
companies within US and slowly expand it to companies outside US. After the scores are
determined, we will conduct more empirical experiments to validate mapped relations
between the factors and the psychological triggers. At first, in a simulated organizational
setup, real human subjects will be invited to participate for crude analysis and automation
of the framework. After which our goal is to conduct real experiments in a real
organization by initiating research collaboration with the companies. The impact of
organizational and national culture will be measured through questionnaires based on
existing models of Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and Multi-Focus Model on
Organizational Culture. The occupational traits of employees will be measured using the
Business-focused Inventory of Personality (BIP). Based on these models, a metric will be
designed to evaluate the performance of the subjects. Then, the result will be analyzed to
compute the weight and scores of employees.
These computed scores would be used during the designing of our simulated SE attack in
order to give focus to the techniques and methods that increase the susceptibility of the
employees. The components of the framework will be set according to the computed
scores. As a result, we could analyze the outcome of the attack and evaluate the findings
based on our calculated weight metrics. The computed values should give us an accurate
evaluation of workers' susceptibility to SE attacks within the organization. Hence,
mitigation strategies can be adjusted according to a specific group of workers. Knowing
which factors modify the susceptibility to SE attacks will allows us to detect or even
predict which kinds of attacks will be more likely to succeed in a specific personnel
group which will aid in effective countermeasure steps such as team building, high-level
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personalized awareness training, or rapid cultural transformation towards a securityaware organizational culture.
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